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3 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 had a sensational impact in many different areas 
of society.1 Its effects spanned beyond the financial and economic domain. On the contrary, 
the spillovers of the crisis spanned from strong political reactions, media commotion, to a 
more profound and long-lasting cultural impact, especially for the generation that 
experienced the crisis while approaching adulthood.  
The famous sociologist Zygmunt Bauman claimed that the latest financial crisis 
represented a disruptive generational event, defining the end of the previous generation 
and introducing a “new normal” according to which people’s hopes, fears and expectations 
were re-calibrated. 
Every generation has its measure of outcasts. There are people in each 
generation assigned to outcast status because a ‘generation change’ 
must mean some significant change in life conditions and life demands 
likely to force realities to depart from expectations implanted by the 
conditions-quo-ante. […] When looking back from the second decade of 
the 21st century, we can hardly fail to notice that when confronted with 
the profound changes brought about by the latest economic collapse, 
each one of those previous passages between generations may well 
seem to be an epitome of inter-generational continuity. Indeed, after 
several decades of rising expectations, the present-day newcomers to 
adult life confront expectations falling – and much too steeply and 
abruptly for any hope of a gentle and safe descent. 2 
This generational event provoked an impressive and almost unprecedented legislative 
response by several national and supranational institutions, shaping a new regulatory 
architecture both at a global and regional level.3 This holds true especially for the European 
 
1 Zygmunt Bauman and Carlo Bordoni, State of Crisis (John Wiley & Sons 2014). 
2 Zygmunt Bauman and Neal Lawson, A Chronicle of Crisis: 2011-2016 (Social Europe Edition 2017) 1. 
3 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge 
University Press 2015). 
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Union, where the regulatory framework proved entirely inapt to face a systemic crisis, 
primarily because of fragmentation of national laws.4  
Looking back at the financial crisis, two striking features capture the attention of 
layperson in Main Street:5 the enormous amount of bailout money given out by states6 and 
the absurd level of compensation to bankers whose bank went underwater because of the 
disproportionate risks they undertook.7 The first aspect relates to how banks fail, whereas 
the second pertains to the domain of bank governance and the incentives faced by bankers 
when making risky decisions.  
Unsurprisingly, these areas attracted the attention of the post-crisis legislators. 
Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic committed to do everything within their power to 
prevent a similar meltdown from happening again in the future. The key motto was: “Never 
again”. 
For instance, in presenting the Dodd-Franck Act, President Obama stated: 
This economic crisis began as a financial crisis, when banks and financial 
institutions took huge, reckless risks in pursuit of quick profits and massive 
bonuses.  When the dust settled, and this binge of irresponsibility was over, 
several of the world's oldest and largest financial institutions had 
collapsed, or were on the verge of doing so. […] Never again will the 
American taxpayer be held hostage by a bank that is ‘too big to fail’.8 
 
4 Charles Enoch and others, From Fragmentation to Financial Integration in Europe (International Monetary 
Fund 2013). 
5 Used in opposition to Wall Street, referring to people that are not part of the financial world.  
6 For instance, in the U.S. the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), the more relevant source of bailout money for US financial institutions. The TARP had 
the authorization to spend up to 700 billion $. In the EU, the European Commission approved State Aid 
measures for 4.5 trillion euro, equivalent to the 37% of the EU GDP of 2008. See, European Commission, New 
crisis management measures to avoid future bank bailouts, MEMO/12/416. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_12_570 (accessed 04-04-2020). 
7 Lucian A Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at 
Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010) 27 Yale J. on Reg. 257. It has been estimated that between 1993 
and 2007, while serving as CEO, Mr. Fuld received almost half a billion dollars. 
8 Remarks by the President on Financial Reform, 21 January 2010. Available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform (accessed 16-
02-2020). 
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In the EU, one of the major cornerstones of the post-crisis financial reforms consisted 
in establishing a European Recovery and Resolution Framework for ailing banks, whose 
declared main goals are to preserve the stability of the European financial market and to 
avoid “to the largest extent possible” resorting to the use of public money in handling 
banks’ crises.9 
This dissertation examines the post-crisis regulatory framework, assessing to what 
extent it implements those political commitments. More specifically, it investigates 
whether and to what extent those are contributing to avoid (i.e.: minimise the probability 
of) future financial meltdowns. In more technical words: this research assesses the impact 
of the resolution framework on the governance of banks, i.e. on the quality of their 
decision-making. 
1. Problem Definition 
The main problem this dissertation endeavours to address is the impact of the recovery 
and resolution framework for ailing banks on the governance of European banks. The 
ultimate aim is to understand how and to what extent a clear and credible institutional 
framework regulating banks’ failures enhances the decision-making process of banking 
institutions and, in turn, their resilience. 
This query involves many different aspects of banks’ behaviour and their inter-
relations. It is, thence, essential to disentangle the main elements to address: bank 
governance and the recovery and resolution framework for ailing banks.   
Bank governance represents the central aspect of this dissertation. Poor decision 
making and excessive risk incentives in the period leading up to the crisis proved to boost, 
if not to cause, the financial meltdown.  
 
9 See Recital n 1 BRRD: “The financial crisis has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools at 
Union level to deal effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions and investment firms (‘institutions’). 
Such tools are needed, in particular, to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimise negative 
repercussions by preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned. During the 
crisis, those challenges were a major factor that forced Member States to save institutions using taxpayers’ 
money. The objective of a credible recovery and resolution framework is to obviate the need for such action 
to the greatest extent possible”. 
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In this regard, the final report of the “High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the 
EU”, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, stated: 
“[Corporate Governance] is one of the most important failures of the 
present crisis. […] Looking back at the causes of the crisis, it is clear that 
the financial system at large did not carry out its tasks with enough 
consideration for the long-term interest of its stakeholders.”10 
In a similar vein, a growing body of empirical research demonstrates how banks with 
“better” corporate governance performed worse during the crisis. For instance, Beltratti 
and Stultz concluded that 
“Our results show that no evidence exists that banks with a better 
alignment of the CEO’s interests with those of the shareholders had 
higher stock returns during the crisis. Some evidence shows that banks 
led by CEOs whose interests were better aligned with those of their 
shareholders had worse stock returns and a worse return on equity”.11 
Nowadays, there is ample evidence showing that the shareholder centric governance 
paradigm incentivises excessive risk-taking, especially in good time, and that such excessive 
risk-taking contributes to build-up systemic risk. These features of bank governance result 
in the impossibility to foster social welfare by maximising shareholders’ value.  
Those few remarks suffice to understand a certain tension between the governance 
of non-financial corporations and bank governance. And even more, on the concept of 
“good corporate governance” for banks. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the idea 
that “bank governance is special” attracted a certain degree of consensus.12 Such specialty 
would open the door to substantial departures from the plain “shareholder value” 
 
10 Jacques De Larosière and others, ‘Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’ [2009] 
European Commission. Brussels. 
11 Andrea Beltratti and René M Stulz, ‘The Credit Crisis around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform 
Better?’ (2012) 105 Journal of Financial Economics 1. 
12 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton and Ailsa Röell, ‘Why Bank Governance Is Different’ (2011) 27 Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 437. 
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maximisation paradigm, widely employed in non-financial firms.13  Nevertheless, both the 
academic and the regulatory debates over bank governance fell short in operationalising 
the fact that bank governance is special.14  
For instance, professors Armour and Gordon, discussing the desirable regulatory 
reforms in the area of bank governance, stated: 
“We should emphasize that we are far surer of the significance of the 
problem we document than we are of the efficacy of our proposed 
solutions, which we present primarily as a heuristic framework for 
debate”.15 
Thus, when it comes to bank governance and the incentives stemming therein, 
proposing a theoretical framework to operationalise those specialties represents a 
quintessential goal. The inter-linkages between bank governance and regulation and the 
role of debt ought to constitute the foundation of this framework. 
This latter observation directly leads to the second central component of this research. 
The European Legislator established a new and unprecedented framework on recovery 
and resolution of banks.16  
The framework harmonises the tools and procedures to deal with bank distress 
through the whole European Union. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
regulates the procedures, the tools and the powers to handle bank distress, from the phase 
of preparation to resolution. It mandates Member States the task to designate an 
administrative authority, the Resolution Authority, to exercise the powers provided by the 
 
13 The dissertation does not enter in the debate over the “shareholder value maximisation” paradigm in non-
financial firms, but simply takes it for granted and evaluates whether the argument grounding this approach 
for non-financial firms hold in banking 
14 Christoph van der Elst, ‘Corporate Governance and Banks: How Justified Is the Match?’ (2015) 284/2015. 
15 John Armour and Jeffrey N Gordon, ‘Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value’ (2014) 6 Journal of Legal 
Analysis 35, 40. 
16  Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BBRD) - Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment firms [2014] OJ L 173. 
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Directive17. Moreover, in the process leading to the “European Banking Union”, a central 
Resolution Authority was established for the Eurozone countries.18  
For the time being, it suffices to say that the overarching idea behind the recovery and 
resolution framework is that banks failures must be paid by the investors in the bank and 
not by the generality of taxpayers through bailout money.  That overarching policy goal 
largely shapes the tools provided by the BRRD, especially in the phase of resolution. In 
particular, the bail-in, as opposed to bailout, represents not only the most innovative tool 
provided by the Directive but the quintessential concept behind the whole framework.19  
In performing a bank bail-in, the Resolution Authority exercises the power to write 
down or convert into ordinary shares eligible liabilities issued by the bank under resolution. 
Among the instruments eligible for bail-in, the Directive includes equity, other instruments 
that are part of regulatory capital as well as long-term debt instruments. Therefore, the 
Directive creates a category of creditors, the bail-inable creditors, that are prone to suffer 
losses upon the decision of an administrative authority should the bank enter in distress.  
It is pivotal to stress from the very beginning that bail-inable investors do not enjoy the 
gains from excessive risk-taking in good times, nor they have a say in corporate decisions 
according to statutory corporate law. Yet, in resolution, they face losses in the same way 
shareholders do, according to the seniority of their claim. Accordingly, the link between 
governance incentives, regulation and the role of (bail-inable) creditors represents the core 
problem to address throughout this book.  
Indeed, debt governance represents the area of corporate governance where the 
departure from corporate governance in non-financial firms is more pronounced. 
Moreover, the situation of bank creditors is highly dependent on the existing regulation, 
being it the resolution framework for bail-inable creditors or the deposit insurance scheme 
for depositors. Nevertheless, the potential role of bail-inable creditors in the governance 
 
17 Article 3 BRRD. 
18 Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) - REGULATION (EU) No 806/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for 
the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 
19 Paul Calello and Wilson Ervin, ‘From Bailout to Bail-In’ 30 The Economist (2010). 
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of financial institutions did not represent the goal of the resolution framework. Accordingly, 
both policymakers and many academics widely neglected it.20  
From an ex-ante perspective, the fact that banks cannot rely any longer on the implicit 
guarantee of the State on their solvency is widely considered the main channel through 
which the resolution framework should influence bank decisions and markedly decrease 
the moral hazard of bankers in undertaking excessive risk.21  
Therefore, discussing the ex-ante expectations stemming from the recovery and 
resolution framework necessarily means to engage in a set of problems that relates to the 
role of bail-inable creditors.22 Among these, a central feature is “resolvability”. In the 
context of the dissertation, resolvability means the combination of two linked but separate 
aspects: the practical feasibility of a resolution (e.g.: issuing enough bail-inable securities)23 
and the political appetite for resolution. The first anecdotal attempts to use resolution 
powers clashed with considerable resistance by politicians, striving to avoid imposing losses 
on the investors of banks in resolution.24 
Having defined the subject matter, three kinds of problems arise. The first of these 
problems relate to how bank governance and financial regulation and supervision weave 
together. In this respect, two competing approaches exist.  
On the one hand, the first approach postulates the assimilation of bank corporate 
governance with the governance of any other corporation. According to the assimilation 
theory of bank governance, substantive regulation should tackle the peculiarities of 
banking impacting on the incentives of decision-makers, such as capital, liquidity 
requirements, and supervisory oversight.25 Thus, regulation and supervision should mimic 
 
20 Iris HY Chiu, ‘Corporate Governance: The Missing Paradigm in the Mandatory Bail-in Regime for Creditors 
of Banks and Financial Institutions’ [2014] Journal of business law 611. 
21 Jianping Zhou and others, ‘From Bailout to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial 
Institutions’ [2012] Journal Issue 3. 
22 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, ‘Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-Ins’ (2015) 1 Journal of Financial 
Regulation 3. 
23 Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL). 
24 Tobias H Tröger, ‘Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Regime’ (2018) 4 Journal of Financial Regulation 35. 
25 Dewatripont Mathias and Jean Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks, vol 1 (MIT Press 1994). 
Part I – Bank Governance and the Resolution Framework 
  
 
10 
market forces, substituting for the governance features that the peculiarity of banking 
disable, such as the ability of creditors to impose discipline on their borrowers.26 
On the other hand, the second approach proposes the complementarity of governance 
with regulation and supervision.27 In this view, providing appropriate incentives to 
corporate actors complements the possible flaws and deficiencies of substantive regulation 
and supervisory oversight. The complementarity approach hints at the possibility of 
shaping the incentives of bank decision-makers not only through substantive regulation but 
also through governance regulation. 
So far, both the literature and the policymaker focused mainly on how governance 
regulation can complement substantive rules and supervision.28 In this regard, the 
regulation of remuneration packages board committees represent paradigmatic 
examples29. Yet, so long as governance regulation does not consider the specificities of 
bank governance, this represents a narrow-minded approach and could cause unintended 
consequences.30   
This research builds on this second stream of literature and aims to address the 
abovementioned shortcomings of the literature and policymaking. In particular, this thesis 
adds to the scientific debate on bank governance and regulation the necessity to fine-tune 
substantive and governance regulation. This could provide bankers with a coherent and 
compelling incentive structure oriented toward the long-term resilience of the institution.  
 
26 Lane defined market discipline as the ability of financial markets to provide signals leading borrowers to 
engage in projects consistent with their solvency. Timothy D Lane, ‘Market Discipline’ (1993) 40 IMF Staff 
Papers 53, 55.  
27 John Armour and others, ‘Bank Governance’ (2016) ECGI Law Working Paper 316/2016. 
28 David A Becher and Melissa B Frye, ‘Does Regulation Substitute or Complement Governance?’ (2011) 35 
Journal of Banking & Finance 736. 
29 See articles 91-95 of the Capital Requirements Directive,  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. OJ L 176/2013 
30 As noted by Luca Enriques and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board 
Regulation Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive’ (2015) 16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
211; Kevin J Murphy, ‘Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended 
Consequences’ (2013) 19 European Financial Management 631. 
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The second problem deals with the impact of the current resolution framework on bank 
governance. This implies a positive analysis of the recovery and resolution framework and 
of the expectations it generates on bank decision-makers ex-ante.  
This represents a specific aspect of the relationship between bank governance and 
substantive regulation that the thesis will focus on. For the time being, it suffices to say 
that the impact of the resolution framework on bank governance represents a heavily 
understudied issue31. Moreover, the interception between governance and resolution 
mainly comprises debt governance. i.e.: the incentives and channels through which 
creditors can influence the decision-making of their borrower in a way consistent with their 
solvency.32  
In addressing this gap in the literature, the thesis will show how the new resolution 
framework for ailing banks has the potential to enhance the quality of bank governance as 
well as bank resilience.  
Last but not least, the third main problem related to the subject matter is to identify 
room for further regulatory interventions fine-tuning debt governance with the substantive 
resolution regulation and, consequently, enhancing the quality of bank governance. 
2. Research Question 
Based on the presentation of the problem, the fundamental question of this research is:  
can the resolution framework for distressed banks enhance the 
quality of banks’ decision making? 
The answer to this overarching question cannot be given all at once. On the contrary, 
this question is split into sub-questions that will form different building blocks of the 
analysis. Assessing the impact and the potential of a regulatory framework requires 
answers to smaller, intermediate questions. 
 
31 With some notable exceptions, see for instance Chiu (n 21). 
32 Lane (n 27) 55. 
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Therefore, the investigation is divided into three main sub-questions which pertain to, 
respectively, the theoretical framework, the positive and the normative sides of the central 
research question. 
1. What is the relation between bank governance and substantive financial regulation? 
And, in particular, what is the relation between debt governance in banking and the 
resolution framework? 
This first question involves the fundamental and somehow philosophical question of 
what good governance for banks is. To answer this question, the thesis critically discusses 
the main economic theories on both corporate governance and banking regulation, 
highlighting the inter-relations between the two spheres and discussing how these 
influence one another. In particular, the analysis questions the traditional paradigm of 
“shareholder value maximisation” as the benchmark of “good corporate governance” 
fostering social welfare. Due to the specific capital structure of banks and the institutional 
design of financial regulation, there are compelling reasons to argue that some deviations 
from that traditional paradigm are warranted. 
 This allows taking the analysis a step further as compared to the well-documented fact 
that “bank governance is special” and attempt to operationalise such specialty. In so doing, 
bank governance and the rules shaping it are conceptualised as a medium between the 
peculiar incentives of bank’s decision-makers and the goals of the substantive regulations.  
The main take away point is that regulators cannot take for granted the incentive 
alignment of bankers to their desiderata simply through regulation. On the contrary, 
corporate governance rules may fine-tune bankers’ incentives with regulatory goals. The 
discussion on bank corporate governance and its relationship with substantive regulation 
highlights the crucial role of debt governance and a sound resolution framework as a 
missing piece in the academic and regulatory debate.  
This opens the way to narrow down the focus of the analysis to the specific impact of 
the European Resolution Framework on the governance of European banks, wondering 
whether it actually, or potentially, enables debt governance. 
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Compared with the previous literature, the thesis brings the debate on the relationship 
between governance and regulation a step forward. The analysis embraces the 
complementarity approach to bank governance and enriches the existing literature by 
analysing the role of governance regulation33.  
Establishing the link between the resolution framework and bank governance also adds 
to the existing state of the literature on bank resolution that largely neglects governance 
considerations.34 
From the perspective of bank governance, linking it to the resolution framework 
provides a fresh view on the long-lasting debate on “good bank governance”35, advancing 
the understanding of how to operationalise the distinctive features of bank governance in 
regulation. 
2. What is the impact of the current resolution framework on bank governance? 
The second question is to understand the impact of the resolution framework as it is on 
the corporate governance of banks. This work will look predominantly at debt governance. 
More specifically, this question addresses whether the resolution framework alters the 
incentives of debtholders in a way consistent with the long-term stability and resilience of 
the bank. This general query boils down to many questions related to the channels through 
which debt governance operates in non-financial firms. Does the resolution framework 
enhance the level of market discipline imposed on banks? Does the resolution framework 
allow contractual solution with which the investors can efficiently allocate control powers? 
Does the composition of the investors in bail-inable securities matter for corporate 
governance?  
These smaller, more specific, questions are answered through the scrutiny of the 
regulatory design of the resolution framework. The analysis discusses whether and how it 
impacts on the incentives of debtholders and their relationship vis-à-vis other corporate 
 
33 The role of governance regulation, with a sharply different approach and result, was also the focus in Steven 
L Schwarcz, ‘Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World’ (2017) 
58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1335. 
34 Chiu (n 21). 
35 Renée B Adams and Hamid Mehran, ‘Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?’ 
(2003) 9 Economic Policy Review 123. 
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constituencies. In other words, these aim at understanding whether corporate governance 
incentives of bankers are fine-tuned with the goals set down by the resolution framework. 
Answering this sub-question widens the understanding of the current literature on the 
ex-ante impact of the EU resolution framework. Up until now, the debate focusses on 
whether and to what extent the resolution framework increases the ability and willingness 
of investors to correctly price bank subordinated debt, internalising the costs of a future 
failure.36 The thesis shows how such a debate is only a small fraction of the entire picture. 
In so doing, the dissertation considers the price adjustment channel but is not limited to 
that. It also takes into consideration other channels of creditors’ influence, such as 
contracts and closed-door pressure. In this latter regard, the composition of debtholders 
proves to be quintessential, tough almost entirely neglected by the existing literature.37 
3. Can normative intervention improve the fine-tuning of governance incentives with the 
resolution framework? 
Finally, this third question moves to a more normative approach to the subject matter, 
wondering whether additional statutory intervention on bank governance can help fine-
tuning bankers’ incentives with the regulation. In so doing, the proposals do not aim at 
completeness and exhaustiveness. Rather, those address two salient aspects of corporate 
governance such as remuneration and voting rights, relating those to a broader view of 
bank governance in which debt governance plays a central role in fostering the long-term 
solvency and resilience of the bank. 
The specific contribution of each policy proposal to the scientific and policy debate is 
discussed more at length in Section 5 and the proceeding of the dissertation. Nonetheless, 
at this point, it is essential to point out that the dissertation will consider both cash flow 
rights of bank management and voting rights of constituencies other than shareholders. 
The two aspects necessarily complement each other. This already represents an aspect of 
originality compared to the existing literature that often approaches separately to cash 
flow and voting right, as if they were watertight containers. 
 
36 See Tröger (n 25). From an empirical perspective see Fabrizio Crespi, Emanuela Giacomini and Danilo V 
Mascia, ‘Bail‐in Rules and the Pricing of Italian Bank Bonds’ (2018) 25 European Financial Management 1321. 
37 Wolf-Georg Ringe and Jatine Patel, ‘The Dark Side of Bank Resolution: Counterparty Risk through Bail-In’ 
(2019) 31. 
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3. Methodology 
The methodology will be chosen according to the research question(s). Generally speaking, 
the methodological approach follows the need to identify and understand the relation 
between two traditionally distinct spheres: governance and substantive financial 
regulation, and in particular resolution regulation. 
The theoretical framework builds on the traditional theoretical approaches to both 
corporate governance and financial regulation. In particular, bank corporate governance is 
approached through the agency theory of the firm.38 Insights from the incomplete contract 
theory and contingent allocation of control enrich the agency approach to governance.39 
These are particularly suitable for the analysis of the ex-ante creditors’ role in corporate 
governance. 
On the other hand, the traditional theory on banking and banking regulation helps 
explaining how incentives in the financial sector are different from the ones assumed in 
the governance of non-financial firms. The discussion builds on the standard model of bank 
fragility and run risk.40  
Another crucial contribution shaping the methodological approach is the moral hazard 
resulting from the implicit guarantee on banks’ solvency.41 
Finally, a further important element is the concept of “systemic externalities” stemming 
from banking activities, i.e.: the idea that the risks undertaken by individual institutions spill 
over the entire financial system and the real economy.42 This feature reveals to be crucial 
for the incentive analysis. Indeed, banks in making decisions about their risk profile do not 
 
38 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of financial economics 305. Following agency theory, Andrei Shleifer 
and Robert Vishny defined corporate governance as: “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey 
of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 The journal of finance 737, 737. 
39 Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’ (1992) 59 
The review of economic Studies 473. 
40 Douglas W Diamond and Philip H Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’ (1983) 91 Journal of 
political economy 401. 
41 A crucial aspect of the analysis is, indeed, to assess whether moral hazard concerns have been addressed 
by the new regulatory framework. 
42 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Geo. LJ 193. 
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internalise the (systemic) social costs of their activities.43 This implies that traditional 
wisdom in corporate governance, according to which maximising shareholders value 
fosters social welfare, is not likely to hold in banking. 
Within the framework built on these methodological specifications, the question of the 
impact of regulation on the decision making of banks is, ultimately, an empirical matter. 
Yet, the dissertation does not engage itself in statistical and econometric exercises for 
several reasons. First, granular data on transactions, prices, supervisory decisions, etc. are 
not publicly available.44 Second, the resolution framework was established in the EU 
relatively recently. Political and media commotion accompanied its implementation, and 
its enforcement is to this date uncertain. Therefore, any statistical exercise suffers from 
the high degree of noise surrounding bank resolution. Third, the literature has not 
identified a bullet-proof design for causal identification of the impact of governance on the 
stability of individual banks and the financial system as a whole. 
Hence, qualitative methods investigating the incentives structure of relevant actors in 
bank resolution appear to be more promising in fostering the understanding of bank 
corporate governance and the ex-ante effects of the resolution framework. 
Nevertheless, available empirical evidence should, to the largest extent possible, drive 
the research. Consequently, empirical studies carried out by financial economists on the 
role of governance in the latest financial crisis will be largely relied upon.  
Even though nobody identified a clear causal flow between governance the crisis, all the 
available studies point at one clear-cut evidence. The banks that, according to traditional 
metrics, were thought to have better corporate governance performed worse during the 
financial crisis.45 Therefore, when proposing departures from the standard paradigms of 
 
43 Armour and Gordon (n 16). 
44 For instance, Chapter 6 attempts to assess the composition of the holders of bail-inable securities. Yet, only 
data aggregated at country level are available; whereas granular data at transaction level are collected by the 
competent and resolution authorities but kept confidential.  
45 The load of literature on this specific issue is now considerable. Many studies will be reviewed and discussed 
throughout the book. For the time being, it suffices to refer to one of the first and most influential study by 
Andrea Beltratti and René Stultz, showing that banks whose governance was more aligned to shareholders’ 
interests performed worse during the crisis. See Beltratti and Stulz (n 12). 
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corporate governance, available empirical studies will play the role of “validity check” of 
the arguments advanced in the thesis. 
Assumptions represent an inevitable part of any Law and Economics research. Through 
the dissertation, assumptions are kept to a minimum, not to lose a complex view of reality. 
Nonetheless, few assumptions are necessary so to make sense of the convoluted relation 
of governance incentives and regulation. The full credibility of the resolution framework 
will often be assumed. Full credibility of the resolution framework means that the 
competent and resolution authorities always and consistently use their powers so that 
market players can base their decisions also on the expectation of the future application of 
the resolution powers. 
This is functional to identify the discrete impact of resolution in the governance 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, the assumption is subsequently relaxed to provide a more 
nuanced picture of the incentives in a world where bank resolution is not fully credible. 
To satisfactorily answer the research question(s), the thesis employs positive and 
normative methodologies.46 The formulation of a theoretical framework for examining the 
role of corporate governance of banks in their resilience as well as their relationship with 
the rules on resolution of distressed banks employs positive analysis. The same goes for 
assessing the impact of the new European Resolution framework on bank corporate 
governance.  
On the contrary, normative and prescriptive analysis drives the last part of the 
dissertation, where specific policy proposals are advanced, intending to enhance bank 
governance in relation to the resolution framework.  
The aim of the thesis is not to stop to positive economics, answering the question “what 
is”, but endeavours to take a step forward and study “what ought to be”. Yet, normative 
questions cannot be independent of positive questions.47 Rather, answering positive 
questions represents a necessary precondition to approach normative questions sensibly. 
 
46 Jan M Smits, ‘Law and Interdisciplinarity: On the Inevitable Normativity of Legal Studies’ (2014) 1 Critical 
Analysis of Law 75. 
47 Uskali Maki and Uskali Mäki, The Methodology of Positive Economics: Reflections on the Milton Friedman 
Legacy (Cambridge University Press 2009) 4. 
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It follows that the thesis is consequentialist: the positive part builds on the theoretical 
framework. In turn, the normative part builds on the shortcomings of bank governance 
highlighted in the positive analysis. 
4. Scope and Limitations  
The ways in which the resolution framework for ailing banks shapes the incentives of bail-
inable creditors in good times represent the focal point of the thesis. This, indeed, appears 
as the most suitable focal point to answer the research questions. In particular, the subject 
of the investigation is threefold. First, investigating how the incentives provided by the 
resolution framework shape the role of bail-inable creditors on the governance of banks. 
Second, investigating the relationship of the bail-inable creditors with banks and vis-à-vis 
other corporate actors, such as the management or shareholders. Third, investigating 
whether the changes in bank governance and the role of creditors have the potential to 
enhance the stability and resilience of banks.     
This research questions a multiplicity of dimensions, and accurately identify its scope 
may appear challenging. To this end, defining its borders by subtraction and highlighting its 
limitations seem to be the more sensible way to proceed. The proceeding of this section 
defines the limitations of this research across its relevant dimensions. Namely, its 
geographical, time-related, subjective and objective dimensions. 
As for the geographical limitation; the research mainly focuses on the European Union 
and, in some instances, more specifically on the Eurozone. There is a dichotomy in the EU 
law on banking regulation between substantive rules and the rules on the institutional 
framework and the procedures of implementation and enforcement of the substantive 
regulations.  
The substantive rules are binding for each Member State, to build a level playing field 
in the internal market. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and 
the European sovereign debt crisis, the European legislator undertook the task to create a 
European Banking Union for the countries belonging to the Eurozone48. In undertaking this 
 
48 Herman Van Rompuy and others, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, vol 5 (2012). 
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enormous effort, the European legislator created, for instance, a centralised authority in 
charge of the supervision and resolution of the banks located in the Eurozone.49 It is not 
time to lose our way in the intricacies of the institutional architecture of the European 
Banking Union. Yet, this brief caveat proved necessary as this research mainly focuses on 
substantive rules that apply to the whole European Union. However, in some instances, the 
specific way of proceeding within the Eurozone makes not only an institutional difference 
but also a substantive one. In this case, the discussion will also focus specifically on the 
Eurozone. 
Conversely, this research does not carry on a comparative analysis of different 
regulatory regimes. Thus, the references to US and UK regulations are limited and strictly 
functional to better focus the key concepts of the European regime.  
The second dimension to consider is the time-related dimension. This aspect pertains 
to the fraction of the lifecycle of a bank considered. The focus of the research is on the 
expectations generated by the regulatory framework and the backward induction that 
decision-makers might do. Thus, the thesis does not treat the immediate vicinity of 
insolvency neither the governance incentives in resolution procedures. Rather, the thesis 
zooms in the incentives of the relevant actors in good times: when the economy is 
booming, and bankers have incentives to take disproportionate risks contributing to piling-
up systemic risk.50  
The third relevant dimension concerns the subjects in the spotlight. In this regard, bail-
inable creditors have, indisputably, the leading role. Granting bail-inable creditors the 
leading role on the scene means that the dissertation will develop those as round 
characters rather than flat once, highlighting all their relevant characteristics and the 
evolutions are experiencing. The scene also features a wide array of supporting casts, such 
as other corporate constituencies and regulatory agencies. Yet, those other actors are 
mainly part of the scene for their relationships vis-à-vis bail-inable creditors. Thus, their full 
 
49 Jean Pisani-Ferry and others, ‘What Kind of European Banking Union?’ [2012] Brugel Policy Contribution. 
50 Claudio Borio, ‘The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We Learnt?’ (2014) 45 Journal of 
Banking & Finance 182. 
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characterisation is not always indispensable so that the reliance on existing literature is 
extensive. 
Finally, the last relevant dimension to consider is the object of the analysis. Several 
aspects of the resolution framework have the potential to generate expectations on 
corporate actors. However, it is not possible to devote the same degree of attention to all 
these different aspects. In this regard, the element to decide whether to include or not any 
specific aspect is the role the bail-inable creditors have in that regard. Therefore, represent 
the main objects of the investigation are expectations ingenerated by the resolution tools, 
particularly the bail-in and the potential those have to impact the decision making of 
corporate constituencies ex-ante.  
Following this line of reasoning, the thesis does not directly address the preparation 
phase to resolution, and especially the rules on resolution planning and resolvability 
assessment. It only makes few sporadic references so long as those are functional to better 
examine the position and the governance role of bail-inable creditors. Moreover, the 
dissertation does not directly assess the impact of the proposal advanced throughout the 
analysis on the resolution planning. Despite the clear links between this aspect and the 
core topic of the thesis, the choice is justified as resolution planning mainly pertains to the 
role of the Resolution Authority and has little to do with investors’ and managerial 
incentives. Nonetheless, this represents a worthwhile aspect that is left to further research. 
In the same way, a plethora of rules, standards and guidelines on more traditional 
features of bank governance are not directly part of the research. This is the case for the 
rules on the risk-management function, the composition of the board, the fit-and-proper 
requirements for bank directors and owners, the group structure and the rules on group 
governance. Some degree of attention is devoted to the rules on directors’ the 
remuneration and risk-takers. The final part of the thesis discusses those governance 
arrangements regarding bail-inable debt and the potential role of bail-inable creditors in 
corporate governance. 
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5. Structure of the Dissertation 
It is now convenient to provide a synopsis of the arguments, key concepts, theories and 
ideas shaping the dissertation. This roadmap will help the reader to keep sight of the overall 
flow of the thesis, without losing the way in the labyrinthic details of EU banking regulation. 
The dissertation consists of three main parts: the first builds the theoretical 
framework. The second performs a positive analysis of the impact of the BRRD on the 
governance of banking institutions. The third proposes two distinct normative 
improvements to the current regulatory framework for addressing the shortcomings 
highlighted in the second part. 
Part I comprises Chapters 2 and 3. Its focus is on setting a sound theoretical 
framework, discussing the two main building blocks of the thesis: bank governance and the 
recovery and resolution framework. It highlights how these two areas are inter-related and 
how the literature largely neglected these inter-relations. 
Chapter 2 introduces bank governance, highlighting why and how corporate 
governance of financial institutions is special as compared with non-financial corporations. 
It discusses the role of negative (systemic) externalities of banking activities, and the 
perverse incentives structure faced by shareholders, especially in good times.  
The second part of the chapter moves the focus to the regulations of bank governance 
and pinpoints how these pieces of regulation are often not tailored to the specificities of 
bank governance. Rather, these often represent a mere crystallisation of existing best 
practices or, even worse, an attempt to extract political benefit from a harsh attitude 
towards the banking industry in the aftermath of the financial crash.  
Finally, the chapter discusses the role of debt governance in banking and how its usual 
channels are largely unavailable. It argues that, if appropriately enabled by specific 
regulatory intervention, debt governance has the potential to positively complement the 
effort of the regulator and the supervisor in achieving the resilience of the bank. In this 
respect, governance regulation should be conceptualised as a medium, necessary to fine-
tune the special incentives of bank constituencies and goals of substantive regulation.  
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Compared to the rest of the literature, this chapter proposes a new approach to 
operationalize the specialty of bank governance, identifying two crucial features: the role 
of regulating governance in linking substantive regulation and governance incentives; and 
the importance of debt governance.  
Chapter 3 operationalises the theoretical construct proposed in the previous Chapter. 
Indeed, it wonders whether the new European recovery and resolution framework for 
ailing banks might, almost inadvertently, represent an effective medium between 
substantive regulation and governance incentives.  
To this end, the chapter discusses the institutional as well as the substantive 
architecture of the new regulation. Subsequently, it zooms in the resolution tools provided 
by the BRRD and in particular the bail-in tool, discussing the expectations it is supposed to 
ingenerate. The chapter also links the ex-ante potential of the BRRD with debt governance. 
In so doing, it shows how and the conditions under which their intertwinement can 
enhance the quality of bank governance trough the role of bail-inable creditors. 
This chapter mainly reviews and systematize the existing literature on bank resolution 
and its potential to have ex-ante effects. Nonetheless, building upon the framework of 
Chapter 2, this chapter marginally innovates the literature on bank resolution. In particular, 
the chapter discusses the conditions necessary for debt governance to be enabled. 
Moreover, the approach to debt governance is broader as compared with the rest of the 
literature on ex-ante effects of resolution, taking into consideration not only price 
adjustments, but also contracts and the role of different holders of bail-inable securities.  
Part II comprises Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This part positively analyses the impact of the 
BRRD on bank governance. Part II discusses whether the intertwine between the resolution 
framework and debt governance enhances the quality of bank corporate governance. In so 
doing, the various chapters of this Part individually discuss distinct aspects of debt 
governance: market discipline through price adjustment (Chapter 4); contingent allocation 
of control through contracts (Chapter 5); the discrete impact of different debtholders and 
different compositions of debtholders (Chapter 6). 
Chapter 4 addresses a traditional channel of debt governance, which is market-
discipline through price adjustment. This chapter shows that the BRRD provides inherently 
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sub-optimal incentives to bail-inable creditors to monitor banks’ activities and accordingly 
adjust pricing because of competing policy objectives pursued by the Directive.  
In dealing with market discipline through price adjustments, the existing literature had 
focused on the elements of uncertainty, over complexity and lack of credibility. The chapter 
adds to the existing literature, highlighting how disciplining incentives are inherently 
diluted, even assuming smooth functioning and full credibility of the resolution framework.  
Chapter 5 investigates whether bail-inable creditors can discipline their borrower (i.e.: 
the bank) through contractual arrangements attached to bail-inable securities. This 
chapter, building on the incomplete contract theory of debt, passes through the main 
contractual disciplining mechanism checking whether they are available to bail-inable 
creditors given the current financial regulation, highlighting once again a trade-off between 
financial stability and market discipline.  
The chapter concludes that financial contracting over bail- inable securities lack the 
potential for disciplining banks because of the existing regulation on qualitative 
requirements for capital and eligible liabilities. to impact on corporate governance 
positively.  
The analysis of financial contracting fills a void in the literature. No specific studies 
focused on the available contractual mechanisms for long-term creditors in the banking 
context. In so doing, the chapter finds that the financial stability considerations prevail over 
market discipline ones. This finding also adds to the broader literature on the trade-off 
between financial stability and moral hazard. 
Chapter 6 intends to address the composition of bail-inable debtholders and the 
relevance of counterparty risk in resolution. This chapter underlines a wide-spread 
inattention of both academics and policymakers on these issues, addressing the relevant 
trade-offs and providing informative data on bail-inable security holders. It highlights that 
the market is adjusting towards a desirable composition of holders even though a 
considerable room for improvement is still available, and a mix of different investors might 
yield superior outcomes. 
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This exercise deepens the current understanding of the impact of the new framework 
on market preferences, providing evidence on both the credibility of the resolution 
framework and the perspectives of effective application of the new tools. 
Finally, the chapter discusses some possible ways forward, underlining the importance 
of increasing the share of sophisticated investors that are specialised in dealing with bail-
inable securities, especially for junior positions. It proposes a balanced mix of investors with 
different business models and time horizons so to minimise systemic risk while maximising 
governance benefits. The chapter concludes that to incentivise market players to shift 
toward more efficient composition, granting ex-ante governance rights is warranted. 
Part III (Chapter 7 and 8) acknowledges the shortcomings of the regulatory framework 
highlighted in Part II and moves to a normative analysis. In particular, it argues in favour of 
two policy proposals aimed at fine-tuning bank governance and substantive regulation.  
The approach to this normative part combines and complements the study of cash 
flow rights of the management (Chapter 7) with the study of the voting rights to bail-inable 
creditors (Chapter 8). Such complementarity is pivotal and unifies the policy proposals of 
Part III. Such a unified approach is rather uncommon in the literature, that usually treats 
cash flow rights and voting rights separately.  
Chapter 7 proposes a radical change in the current remuneration practices, including 
bail-inable debt within the variable component of remuneration packages. The current 
regulatory framework and resulting practices in the EU appear heavily unsatisfactory since 
they decreased the link between pay and performance. Moreover, it does not consider the 
specificities of bank corporate governance; consequently, the negative externalities it 
generates are still not accounted for.  
The chapter sets the economic rationale for remuneration, highlighting the special 
case of the banking industry and explaining why debt can be particularly useful in such a 
framework. Against this theoretical framework, the chapter critically assesses the EU 
regulation on the structure of remuneration packages. This highlights how the policy goal 
of optimising risk-taking incentives of bankers is far from being reached and, more 
importantly, that it cannot be achieved without a radical change in the regulatory 
paradigm.  
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The chapter shows why that shift necessarily implies to include bail-inable debt in 
remuneration packages. It also shows how it would tighten the link between pay and 
performance and address the specificities of bank governance. Finally, as an additional 
positive spillovers, remuneration through debt would also enhance the resolvability of the 
institution. The final part of the chapter develops a detailed policy proposal that focuses 
both on the content of the regulation and on the possible implementation strategies. 
The chapter builds on the extensive literature on remuneration in banking and 
innovates in two main ways. First, it fine-tunes governance incentives and the resolution 
framework. This allows not only to have positive effects on the incentives of bankers but 
also to have positive spillovers on the credibility of the resolution framework and the 
resolvability individual institutions. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that cash flow 
rights should change according to the specificities of bank governance through mandatory 
regulation.  
Chapter 8 proposes a deep statutory reform in the area of bank governance, exploiting 
the potential positive synergies with the BRR framework and, in particular, the incentive 
structure of the so-called “bail-inable creditors”. The overarching aim of such a proposal is 
to fine-tune bank governance and substantive regulation and, subsequently, truly 
enhancing the quality of decision-making of banks in terms of risk-taking. At the same time, 
the proposed reform should increase the ex-ante credibility of resolution. 
The second part of the chapter operationalises that theoretical construct, proposing 
to grant bail-inable creditors with a limited set of decision and appointment rights. A 
general principle of sufficient accountability of banks governance arrangements toward 
bail-inable creditors should complement this limited set of rights, so to allow for 
differentiated and proportionate implementation. 
The analysis demonstrates how granting bail-inable creditors with ex-ante governance 
rights can represent a tool to correct for shareholders’ perverse incentives and make debt 
governance work in banking. The policy proposal advanced in the chapter would 
complement substantive regulation and the oversight activity of the competent authority. 
The governance role of creditors has the potential to be particularly helpful in preventing 
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disproportionate risk-taking decisions in good times when regulatory and supervisory 
standards are lax and systemic risk piles-up. 
 
Legal studies face the tedious tendency, for their authors, to become quickly obsolete. 
This particularly holds true in an area of the law such as banking, where rules are 
continuously and deeply revised because of evolving economic conditions, changes in 
social and political preferences and quick innovations in the financial industry. Vast parts 
of this work are, unfortunately, not immune from such dissatisfying attribute. 
 Nonetheless, it is my firm belief that some of the core ideas put forward in the 
proceeding of this book are lasting and adaptable to different times, regulations and factual 
situations. In particular, the necessity to fine-tune the special governance incentives and 
substantive regulation through regulatory intervention on corporate governance as well as 
the discussion over debt governance in the financial industry have the potential to survive 
the transient legal norms in force at the moment of writing. 
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Summary 
[English] 
 
This dissertation assesses the impact of the post-crisis stream of reforms on the corporate 
governance of European Banks. The project deals with the EU Directive on Bank Recovery and 
Resolution (BRRD) and investigate a fundamental question. Can the resolution framework for 
distressed banks enhance the quality of banks’ decision making? 
According to the Directive, an administrative agency, the Resolution Authority, can impose losses 
on (a part of) the bank’s creditors should the bank become “failing or likely to fail”. Bail-inable 
creditors become residual claimants of the bank, contingent on its distress. 
The dissertation proceeds in three main building blocks. First, it addresses the problem of what is 
good governance for banks and how bank governance relates to the resolution framework and to 
bail-inable creditors. Second, it analyses the is the impact of the BRRD on the governance role of 
bail-inable creditors. Third, building on the findings of the positive analysis, it proposes statutory 
reforms to exploit the positive interplay between bank governance and resolution. 
The first part establishes an analytical framework for bank governance, starting from the problem 
of what can be defined as “good governance”. In fact, bank governance is special as compared with 
non-financial corporation, but what constitutes good bank governance is still unknown. The thesis 
contributes to this debate focusing on the relationship between substantive regulation and 
governance.  
The analysis distils two crucial features. First, governance incentives and the goals of substantive 
regulation are often at odds and the two needs to be finetuned for achieving optimal results. 
Second, debt governance represents a crucial yet understudied area in bank governance, as it has 
the potential to curb excessive risk-taking and the (systemic) externalities stemming therefrom. In 
this regard, the existence of the EU resolution framework opens the possibility for a positive 
interplay between governance and regulation.  
This approach innovates the literature on both bank governance and resolution. Bank governance 
is usually approached from the perspective of shareholders and/or the management rather than 
creditors. On resolution, the dissertation widens the current state of the literature on bank 
resolution, linking its ex-ante and ex-post natures. 
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The second part builds upon this analytical framework and carries out a positive analysis 
encompassing three channels of debt governance; namely, price internalisation of risk; contractual 
arrangements and the discrete impact of different type of creditors.  
This approach innovates the debate on market discipline, that is usually limited to the ability of 
creditors to internalise different risk in the price of the securities. The dissertation starts from this 
premise and immediately highlights the efficiency of creditors’ discipline depends on the interplay 
between governance incentives and the design of substantive regulation. The existence of a 
resolution framework should incentivise bail-inable creditors to better discipline the borrowing 
bank; yet, the design of both the capital and resolution regulation largely foreclose such possibility 
to creditors.  
Against this backdrop, the third part of the dissertation moves to the normative question of how to 
enable debt governance so to exploit the positive interplay between governance and resolution. 
The approach to this normative part combines and complements the study of cash flow rights of 
the management with the study of the voting rights to bail-inable creditors. Such a unified approach 
is rather uncommon in the literature, where cash flow rights and voting rights are often approached 
separately whereas those complement each other in the dissertation. 
On the cash flow side, the dissertation proposes to include bail-inable debt as part of the variable 
remuneration for bank risk-takers. This would better align the incentives of bankers with the socially 
desirable outcomes; moreover, it would fix most of the flaws of the existing regulation on 
remuneration. From the standpoint of resolution, the proposal would enhance the credibility of the 
resolution framework and the resolvability of individual institutions.  
On the voting right, the proposal is to grant a limited basket of ex-ante governance rights to bail-
inable creditors. This would truly enable debt governance, circumventing the regulatory 
foreclosures highlighted during the positive analysis and restrain excessive risk-taking incentive in 
good times, when systemic-risk piles-up.  
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[Dutch] 
Deze dissertatie onderzoekt de invloed van de post-crisis stroom van hervormingen van de 
corporate governance van Europese banken. Het project heeft betrekking op de EU-richtlijn 
betreffende herstel en afwikkeling van banken (BRRD) en onderzoekt een fundamentele vraag. Kan 
het afwikkelingskader voor falende banken de kwaliteit verbeteren van het bancaire 
besluitvormingsproces? 
Volgens de Richtlijn kan een administratieve instantie, de Afwikkelingsautoriteit, verliezen opleggen 
aan (een deel van) de crediteuren van de bank indien de bank “faalt of zal gaan falen”. Crediteuren 
die kwalificeren voor bail-in worden resterende schuldeiser van de bank, afhankelijk van de situatie. 
De dissertatie behandelt drie belangrijke bouwstenen. Eerst wordt ingegaan op de vraag wat good 
governance voor banken is en wat de relatie is van governance van banken met het 
afwikkelingskader en met crediteuren die kwalificeren voor bail-in. Vervolgens wordt een analyse 
gemaakt van de invloed van de BRRD op de governancerol van crediteuren die kwalificeren voor 
bail-in. Ten slotte wordt, voortbouwend op de bevindingen van de positieve analyse, een wijziging 
van de regelgeving voorgesteld om te profiteren van de positieve interactie tussen governance en 
afwikkeling van banken.  
Het eerste deel biedt een analytisch kader voor governance van banken, beginnend met de vraag 
wat de definitie is van “good governance”. Vergeleken met niet financiële ondernemingen is de 
governance van banken in feite speciaal, maar wat goede governance van banken inhoudt is nog 
steeds niet bekend. Dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan deze discussie met de nadruk op de 
relatie tussen materiële regulering en governance.  
De analyse onderscheidt twee belangrijke kenmerken. Ten eerste, governanceprikkels en de 
doeleinden van materiële regulering zijn vaak met elkaar in tegenspraak en moeten op elkaar 
worden afgestemd om optimale resultaten te behalen. Ten tweede, governance van schulden 
vormt een belangrijk maar onderbelicht terrein bij governance van banken, omdat dit de 
mogelijkheid heeft om het nemen van excessieve risico’s en de daaruit voortvloeiende 
(systemische) externe omstandigheden in bedwang te houden. In dit opzicht biedt het bestaan van 
het EU-afwikkelingskader de mogelijkheid voor een positieve interactie tussen governance en 
regulering.  
Deze benadering vernieuwt de literatuur over zowel governance als afwikkeling van banken. 
Governance van banken wordt doorgaans benaderd vanuit het perspectief van aandeelhouders 
en/of management en niet vanuit dat van crediteuren. Met betrekking tot afwikkeling verbreedt 
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de dissertatie de huidige stand van de literatuur inzake afwikkeling van banken, door koppeling van 
de ex-ante en ex-post aard daarvan. 
Het tweede deel bouwt verder op dit analytisch kader en voert een positieve analyse uit die drie 
kanalen van governance van schulden omvat namelijk: prijsinternalisering van risico, contractuele 
regelingen en de verschillende gevolgen van verschillende soorten crediteuren.  
Deze benadering vernieuwt de discussie over marktdiscipline, die zich doorgaans beperkt tot het 
vermogen van crediteuren om het verschillende risico in de prijs van de effecten te internaliseren. 
De dissertatie gaat uit van deze vooronderstelling en benadrukt meteen dat de efficiëntie van de 
discipline van crediteuren afhankelijk is van de interactie tussen governanceprikkels en het ontwerp 
van materiële regulering. Het bestaan van een afwikkelingskader zou crediteuren die kwalificeren 
voor bail-in moeten stimuleren om de lenende bank beter te disciplineren, maar het ontwerp van 
zowel de kapitaal- als de afwikkelingsregeling sluit die mogelijkheid voor crediteuren grotendeels 
uit.  
Tegen deze achtergrond gaat het derde deel van de dissertatie over de normatieve vraag hoe het 
voor governance van schulden mogelijk kan worden om de positieve interactie tussen governance 
en afwikkeling te benutten. De aanpak van dit normatieve deel vormt een combinatie en aanvulling 
van het onderzoek naar cashflowrechten van het management met het onderzoek naar de 
stemrechten van crediteuren die kwalificeren voor bail-in. Een dergelijke gebundelde aanpak is 
nogal ongebruikelijk in de literatuur, waar cashflowrechten en stemrechten vaak afzonderlijk 
worden benaderd terwijl deze elkaar in de dissertatie aanvullen. 
Voor wat betreft de cashflowkant, wordt in de dissertatie voorgesteld om de schuld die kwalificeert 
voor bail-in op te nemen als onderdeel van de variabele vergoeding voor de risiconemers van de 
bank. Dit zou de prikkels van bankiers beter afstemmen op de sociaal gewenste resultaten, 
bovendien zou het de meeste tekortkomingen in de bestaande vergoedingsregeling opheffen. 
Vanuit het gezichtspunt van afwikkeling zou het voorstel een verbetering zijn van de 
geloofwaardigheid van het afwikkelingskader en de afwikkelbaarheid van individuele instellingen.  
Voor wat betreft het stemecht is het voorstel om een beperkt aantal ex-ante governancerechten 
te verlenen aan crediteuren die kwalificeren voor bail-in. Dit zou governance van schulden echt 
mogelijk maken, de in de positieve analyse belichte gereguleerde afscherming omzeilen en prikkels 
met excessieve risico’s in goede tijden beperken, wanneer systemische risico’s zich opstapelen.  
Concluderend gaat het proefschrift uit van de vooronderstelling dat governance van banken 
speciaal is. Het bouwt voort op die vooronderstelling en voedt het huidige begrip van governance 
van banken. De dissertatie laat zien dat governance van banken en de nieuwe afwikkeling een 
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positieve interactie kunnen hebben en stelt voor om governance van schulden te versterken als 
een krachtige aanvulling op regulering en toezicht. De dissertatie benadrukt het ex-ante potentieel 
evenals de tekortkomingen van afwikkeling van banken en stelt voor hoe deze tekortkomingen 
opgeheven kunnen worden. Dit zou de prikkels voor excessieve risico’s in aanwezigheid van 
systemische externe omstandigheden in bedwang houden, terwijl een enkel op aandeelhouders 
gebaseerde benadering van governance inefficiënt is. 
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